What the clause gives the injured party
Many commercial contracts state in advance what a party in breach will pay: a fixed sum, a percentage of the price, or an amount for each day of delay. The basis is section 15(a) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970:
If the parties have agreed in advance on the amount of compensation (hereinafter: agreed compensation), the compensation shall be as agreed, without proof of damage; but the court may reduce it if it finds that the compensation was fixed without any reasonable relation to the damage that could have been foreseen at the time the contract was made as a probable consequence of the breach.
Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970, section 15(a) (unofficial translation)
The advantage is clear. Without such a clause, the injured party must generally prove its loss, and under section 10 of the Law only loss that the party in breach foresaw or should have foreseen. The exceptions are the payments section 11 grants without proof of damage, such as interest on a sum paid late. With an agreed damages clause, nothing needs to be proved beyond the breach. In Civil Appeal 8506/13 Zeevi Communications Holdings v. Bank Hapoalim (August 2015), the Supreme Court summarised the case law: the injured party need not prove that it suffered any loss at all, and the compensation will be awarded even if the party in breach proves that the actual loss was lower, or that there was no loss.
Reduction is the exception
In paragraph 42 of the same judgment the Court stated that courts tend to respect the parties' intention and enforce the clause as written. The power to reduce is used only in exceptional cases, and the threshold is high: as long as there is any reasonable relation, "even a strained one", between the compensation and the loss foreseeable at signing, the court will not reduce it.
Even when the threshold is crossed, the court is not obliged to reduce. The Law says "may", and the power is discretionary. The power is also one to reduce, not to strike the clause out altogether, although the case law has remarked that in principle the amount may be reduced substantially, even to a minimal amount.
The test: what could be foreseen when the contract was made
The agreed sum is not compared with the loss that eventually occurred. In Zeevi the Court made clear that the question is not whether the compensation is high or low compared with the actual loss, but whether it was fixed in reasonable relation to the loss foreseeable when the contract was made, as a result of a breach of the kind that occurred. One tool is to compare the agreed sum with the value of the whole contract.
The test is objective. The court asks what reasonable parties could have foreseen, not what these parties actually foresaw. It looks at the specific breach that occurred and asks what would have seemed reasonable had it been before the parties when they signed. The judgment cited, from the legal literature, factors such as the type of contract, its financial scale, its duration, the seriousness and length of the breach, and the number of breaches.
Who bears the burden, and when it shifts
The party in breach that seeks a reduction must persuade the court and bring evidence. One exception concerns drafting: a "sweeping" clause that sets the same compensation for a minor breach and a fundamental breach without distinguishing between them. According to Zeevi, that wording alone is enough to expose the clause to review, and the burden may shift to the injured party to explain why it should not be reduced.
There is also a procedural side. In Civil Appeal 7902/22 State of Israel v. Ter Arma (August 2023), the Court held:
A party seeking the court's power of reduction must raise the claim expressly in its pleadings and must also prove it by laying a proper evidential foundation.
Civil Appeal 7902/22 State of Israel v. Ter Arma Ltd. (30.8.2023), para. 41 (unofficial translation)
In that case the reduction had not been argued before the trial court, and the Supreme Court said it could be rejected on that ground alone. It rejected it on the merits as well, and awarded the State the agreed compensation.
A commercial contract between experienced parties
Where the contract is a bespoke commercial contract between sophisticated and experienced parties, preceded by long negotiations, the assumption is that the compensation clause was weighed as part of the allocation of risk and not written casually. In Zeevi the Supreme Court held that in such a case the burden on the party seeking a reduction is very heavy, but added:
A heavy burden, even a very heavy one, yes; "immunity" of the contract from any intervention whatsoever, no.
Civil Appeal 8506/13 Zeevi Communications Holdings Ltd. v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd. (23.8.2015), para. 47 (unofficial translation)
According to the same judgment, the power to reduce applies in principle to every type of contract. In that case it was in fact used. The case concerned a bank loan with breach interest of 3% a year above the contractual rate. The Supreme Court disallowed the breach interest from mid-2007 until the end of the receivership, more than two years, because from that point the value of the shares pledged to the banks exceeded the debt and the banks were no longer exposed to a risk of non-payment.
A standard-form contract offers a further route. Under section 4(6a) of the Standard Contracts Law, 5743-1982, a term that sets agreed damages that are not reasonable in the supplier's favour is presumed to be unduly disadvantageous, and a court that finds a term unduly disadvantageous cancels or amends it. Zeevi noted that the grounds for intervening in a standard-form contract are wider than in a negotiated one.
Late-payment interest and daily delay compensation
The label on the clause does not decide the matter. Under Zeevi, a clause fixed in advance that gives a party additional consideration because of the other party's breach, without proof of loss, is an agreed damages clause "whatever its economic purpose". That includes late-payment interest and sums that accrue for each day or month of delay.
According to the case law summarised there, compensation that accrues over time is preferable in this respect to a single lump sum, because it distinguishes between a minor and a serious breach. But the assumption is that the parties did not intend compensation "without end and without limit". Where the delay is substantially prolonged, so that there is no longer a reasonable relation to the foreseeable loss, the court may intervene.
In Civil Appeal 1880/19 Lung Disease Prevention League v. Shir Mishkenot Vatikim (October 2020), late-payment interest under a lease had accrued for more than twelve years and almost doubled the debt. The Supreme Court held that in such a situation a "quasi-presumption" arises that the compensation is unreasonable, and the burden shifts to the injured party. It upheld the reduction on two grounds: the clause was not limited in time, and the tenant had deposited a bank guarantee, so that from then on the landlord was no longer exposed to the risk that the debt would not be paid in full. The interest calculation stopped one year after the end of the lease.
Forfeiture of an advance payment
Under section 15(c) of the Law, sums the party in breach paid to the injured party before the breach, which the parties agreed in advance would be forfeited to the injured party, are treated as agreed damages. Such a forfeiture is therefore also subject to the power of reduction.
The agreed sum is not necessarily the end of the matter
Under section 15(b), an agreement on agreed damages does not in itself detract from the injured party's right to claim damages "in their stead" under sections 10 to 14, that is, to forgo the agreed sum and prove the loss actually suffered. Nor does it detract from other remedies, such as enforcement or rescission of the contract.
Under the case law summarised in Ter Arma, the injured party may also combine agreed damages with other compensation or remedies, provided there is no material contradiction between them and no double recovery. Agreed damages for one head of loss do not prevent a claim for a different head of loss.
As for an argument that insisting on high agreed damages is bad faith, the Supreme Court wrote in the same judgment, in passing, that section 15 provides "an orderly legal framework" and that a "bypass route" through the duty of good faith should not be created. It added that merely insisting on a contractual right is not in itself bad-faith conduct. Whether the principle of good faith applies at all to a claim for agreed damages was left open.
Drafting a clause that holds
- Distinguish between types of breach. The same sum for every breach, small or large, is exactly the wording that invites review and may shift the burden.
- Link the amount to the loss expected from a breach of the kind the clause covers, not to a wish to punish.
- For compensation that accrues over time, set a cap or a maximum period. A clause unlimited in time is exposed to reduction when the delay drags on.
- Record in the negotiations what lay behind the amount. If a dispute arises, this helps show that the clause was considered.
- If it comes to litigation: a claim for reduction that was not pleaded expressly and supported by evidence at first instance may be rejected on that ground alone.