No treaty, and the judgments are enforced all the same

There is no treaty between Israel and Russia on mutual enforcement of judgments. The Supreme Court said so expressly in CA 3081/12 Double K Oil Products v. Gazprom Transgaz Ukhta. As a result, direct recognition under section 11(a) of the Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, 5718-1958, which depends on a treaty, is closed to a Russian judgment. The route is an application to declare the judgment enforceable under section 3.

That route is open and in use. In recent years Israeli courts have declared a series of Russian judgments enforceable, among them judgments for large sums in favour of Russian banks. The questions that decide these cases keep coming back, and the Supreme Court has now ruled on each of them.

Reciprocity requires only a reasonable potential for enforcement

Section 4(a) provides that a foreign judgment shall not be declared enforceable if it was given in a state whose laws do not provide for enforcement of Israeli judgments. For Russia that is a real question. Article 241 of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code (the code of procedure for Russia’s commercial courts) makes enforcement of foreign judgments conditional on a treaty, and there is none with Israel.

In Double K the Supreme Court held that there is no need to prove that an Israeli judgment has actually been enforced in Russia, and that a reasonable potential for its enforcement is enough. As to Russia, such a potential was found to exist, on two grounds. The court found that there is a trend in the Russian courts, even if a partial one, to enforce foreign judgments from states with which there is no treaty, and that there is no support for the view that the Russian courts discriminate against Israeli judgments.

The burden on this question falls on the party opposing enforcement, not on the applicant. The court added in Double K that it would have been appropriate for the Attorney General to state a general position on whether Israeli judgments are enforced in Russia. It regretted that this had not happened. The reciprocity finding therefore rests on a trend rather than on a settled fact, and it may shift if a substantial change is proved.

The defendant argues that Russia has shown hostility towards Israel since the seventh of October, but that argument is not directed at the Russian legal system, and in any event general arguments of this kind are not enough to prove discrimination against Israel in the enforcement of foreign judgments.

CC (Central District) 51186-11-22 Lozhenkov v. Krasner (24.3.2026), translated

That is a decision of a trial court (a court of first instance), and it may be subject to appeal. But it shows how the courts are approaching the question. A party wishing to rely on an absence of reciprocity needs evidence of how the Russian courts treat Israeli judgments, not arguments about the state of diplomatic relations.

Service of court papers is tested for reasonableness, not formality

Section 6(a)(2) allows enforcement to be resisted where the opportunity given to the defendant to make his arguments and bring his evidence was not reasonable. In cases involving Russian judgments, that argument often turns on service. The defendant says the statement of claim never reached him, because by then he was living in Israel.

In the case that later reached the Supreme Court as CA 1948/15 JSC VTB Bank v. Margolis, the District Court initially accepted such an argument. It found that Russian law requires delivery to the defendant in person, and that it was unclear who had signed the delivery receipts, since the defendant had not been in Russia at the time. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the question is whether, objectively, the defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to argue and to present evidence. The inquiry, it said, is conducted with care and with respect for other states’ legal systems.

What decided the case was that the summonses and delivery receipts had been sent to the official address the defendant himself had given the bank in the guarantee agreements. In those circumstances service was held to be reasonable, and the Russian judgments were declared enforceable. Creditors and debtors alike should bear in mind that an address a person gives in a contract may follow him after he leaves the country, particularly if he undertook to give notice of any change of address and did not do so.

A civil judgment resting on Russian criminal proceedings

Section 1 defines a foreign judgment as a judgment in a civil matter, including a judgment for payment of compensation to an injured party even where it was not given in a civil matter. Russian law allows the victim to file a civil claim within the criminal proceedings, as happened in Lozhenkov. Another option is a separate civil claim, in which the civil court is bound by the findings of the criminal conviction, as happened in Katziv, discussed below.

In CA 7251/20 Katziv v. ZAO Raiffeisenbank the judgment for enforcement was a civil judgment that rested on a criminal conviction in Russia. It ordered the accused, jointly and severally with his co-accused (each of them being liable for the whole sum), to pay about 961 million roubles. The accused, an Israeli citizen who also held Russian citizenship, had been removed from the courtroom for more than a year and a half after addressing the court abusively. During that period 74 hearings were held and 193 witnesses heard in his absence.

The Supreme Court held that where the civil judgment adopts the findings of the criminal proceedings as binding, as Russian law provides, the reasonableness of the opportunity to defend must be examined in the criminal proceedings themselves as well. The examination is nonetheless objective, and it is measured against the standards of civil proceedings. Even if the Russian criminal process does not match an accused’s rights in Israel, that does not necessarily show that the opportunity was unreasonable. His removal from the hearings was the result of his own conduct, and he was represented throughout the proceedings, so the court held that the infringement of his rights did not justify refusing enforcement. The appeal was dismissed and enforcement stood.

In the same case the court also rejected the argument that the Russian judgment offended public policy, meaning the basic values of the Israeli state and society, including morality, justice and fairness. The court held that, as a rule, a difference between the legal norms of the state of judgment and those applying in Israel does not by itself make the foreign judgment contrary to public policy.

Finality means the judgment is no longer open to appeal

Section 3(2) requires that the judgment whose enforcement is sought be no longer subject to appeal, and the burden of proving this lies on the applicant. The debtor need not have used every available avenue of challenge. A judgment is final once the time for appealing it has passed, and the possibility of having it set aside or varied by the court that gave it does not affect its finality. The Russian system has several tiers of review, so the application should set out which of them were used and when each was dismissed, or when the time for bringing them ran out. In Katziv the court described the path of the civil judgment whose enforcement was sought, through an appeal to the district court in Rostov, an application for leave (permission) to appeal, and an application for a further hearing before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Once all of them had been dismissed, the civil judgment became final.

In practice the point is usually proved by an opinion from an expert in Russian law confirming that the judgment is final and enforceable in Russia. Such an opinion also helps to prove the condition in section 3(4), that the judgment be enforceable in the state where it was given.

Practical points for each side

For a party holding a Russian judgment and seeking to collect in Israel:

  • Under section 5, the application must be filed within five years of the date of the judgment. The court may hear a later application if it finds special reasons justifying the delay, and the courts have recognised as such a reason a situation in which the applicant did not know where the judgment should be enforced. That is an exception, and it is safer to file within the five years.
  • Under regulation 354 of the Civil Procedure Regulations (Foreign Judgments Enforcement), 5744-1984, the application must attach a copy of the judgment certified by a competent Russian authority and an affidavit (a sworn written statement) establishing the four conditions in section 3 of the law. The court may require a certified Hebrew translation under regulation 355.
  • It is worth considering interim relief over assets in Israel, such as an attachment, at the point of filing. That was done in Lozhenkov, for example, where a provisional attachment order over rights in land in Israel was granted when the proceedings were opened. In earlier proceedings between the parties to the Katziv case, LCA 10250/08, the Supreme Court held that the claim should be heard in Russia but left the interim relief over the assets in Israel in place, noting that this would secure the bank’s interest in those assets.

For a party facing a Russian judgment:

  • Under regulation 356, a response may be filed within thirty days of service of a copy of the application, or within any longer period set by the court or the registrar. A respondent who files no response will not be allowed to oppose.
  • Defences built on general criticism of the Russian legal system have not succeeded in the case law. The court looks instead at the facts of the particular case, such as how the papers were delivered and the address to which they were sent. The test is not whether the defendant actually knew of the proceedings, but whether service was reasonable.
  • The Israeli court does not hear an appeal against the Russian judgment. An argument that the Russian judge got the facts or the law wrong will not help unless it falls within one of the section 6 grounds.