The cause of action

Section 191 of the Companies Law, 5759-1999, gives a shareholder a tool against controlling shareholders who run the company at its expense:

Where any matter of a company has been conducted in a manner that oppresses its shareholders, all or some of them, or where there is a material concern that it will be conducted in that manner, the court may, at the request of a shareholder, give such directions as it thinks fit to remove or prevent the oppression, including directions as to how the company's affairs are to be conducted in future, or directions to the shareholders of the company that they, or the company subject to section 301, purchase shares of the company.

Companies Law, 5759-1999, section 191(a) (unofficial translation)

Two features of the wording stand out. It applies where there is a "material concern" of oppression, not only after oppression has occurred. And it leaves the court wide room in choosing the remedy. In addition, section 192(b) places a duty on every shareholder to refrain from oppressing other shareholders.

The test: harm to legitimate expectations

The court does not ask only whether a provision of the articles was breached. In Civil Appeal 8712/13 Adler v. Livnat (September 2015), the Supreme Court restated the established principle that oppression exists where a shareholder's legitimate expectations are harmed, even if no right conferred on it by the company's constitutional documents was breached. In Civil Appeal 8857/21 Ginzburg v. Medipower (February 2023), the Supreme Court listed situations recognised in the case law:

  • Mismanagement of the company.
  • Continuing harm to the minority's expectation of taking part in day-to-day management and in the distribution of profits.
  • A severe breakdown of trust between shareholders in a private company run as a quasi-partnership.

Motive is not the main issue either. Adler states that oppression is determined by the result, that is, whether it is oppressive, and not by the motives of the oppressor.

Private companies and quasi-partnerships

The section also applies to public companies, but the nature of the company affects expectations. In a private company run as a quasi-partnership, meaning a few people who run a business together on the basis of personal trust and an understanding of joint management, shareholders may have a legitimate expectation of taking part in management (Adler). Exclusion from management may then amount to oppression. Courts do not readily classify a company as a quasi-partnership, and they look at the relationship as it developed over time, not only at the circumstances in which the company was founded. The Supreme Court repeated this in Civil Appeal 1264/23 Tolik Rakia Yazamut v. Olirad (October 2023).

According to the majority in Adler, in a quasi-partnership a loss of trust between the partners may justify separating them even without oppression. In Adler the court stressed that this remedy is granted "sparingly", only where it is satisfied that the company is a quasi-partnership and that separation is unavoidable.

Dividends and salaries

Whether to distribute a dividend is usually a business decision of the company, and the court usually declines to intervene. But in Civil Appeal 5025/13 Perat Metal Industries Ltd. v. Dadon (February 2016), Justice Hayut explained that minority shareholders in a private company are more exposed to exploitation, especially in the distribution of profits, because the controlling shareholders enjoy the profits "through salaries and fringe benefits even without a dividend distribution". Not distributing a dividend is not in itself a cause of action. It may be oppressive mainly where the minority enjoys no benefit from the profits in any way and also cannot sell its shares at a price reflecting their value.

In that case the minority was found to have been oppressed. The Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy would have been a compulsory purchase of the minority's shares, but since neither party sought that on appeal, it left in place the order to distribute a dividend of half of the accumulated profits. It added that intervention in the rate of dividend should be exercised "sparingly and with the necessary caution".

Dilution through share issues

Oppression can also arise when new shares are allotted, for example where the allotment is based on too low a valuation. There is then a concern that value passes from those who did not take part in the allotment to those who did. However, an allotment at a low price is not necessarily oppressive. Ginzburg states that issuing shares at a discount is not improper in itself, and that the controlling shareholder or the company may prove there was no oppression: that the issue was made at market value, or that it was made in good faith and in the company's interest and there was no other practical and reasonable way to raise the capital with less harm to the minority. The larger the discount, the heavier the burden.

The burden of proof

The claimant goes first and must present prima facie evidence of oppression. If it succeeds, the burden shifts. Ginzburg states that at that stage the defendant must persuade the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the company was not run in an oppressive manner. The reason: the information about what happened in the company is in the hands of the controlling shareholder.

Remedies

Section 191(a) allows the court to give "such directions as it thinks fit" to remove or prevent the oppression, including:

  • Directions as to how the company's affairs are to be conducted in future.
  • A direction to shareholders, or to the company itself subject to section 301, to purchase shares. This is a "compulsory purchase", which separates the parties.

Changes to the articles and resolutions of the company required by the court's directions are deemed to have been lawfully adopted (section 191(b)).

Adler explains that in the classic situation, where there is an oppressor and an oppressed party, the usual course is for the oppressor to buy the oppressed party's shares at a value that takes the oppression into account. Where separation is needed because of a loss of trust rather than oppression, the usual course is a bidding process between the parties. In Civil Appeal 8776/23 Loskin v. Givot Olam Oil (July 2025), the Supreme Court repeated that a compulsory purchase is generally suited to a situation where a clear minority was oppressed by a clear majority, and upheld a separation by way of bidding. Adler noted that bidding is less suitable where one side has a significant financial advantage, and that a gap in holdings may place an unfair financing barrier before the smaller holder.

This is an equitable remedy, and the court may grant it but is not obliged to. The claimant's own conduct is examined as well: a party who acted in bad faith or came to court without clean hands may be refused relief (Adler).

What to do

  • Keep records: decisions taken without you, salaries and payments to the controlling shareholders, refusals to provide information, share allotments.
  • Check the articles and the shareholders' agreement, if there is one: what you were promised regarding management, appointment of directors and distribution of profits.
  • Act in good faith. Because this is an equitable remedy, your own conduct will also be examined.
  • In a new company: agree in advance on an exit and separation mechanism in the shareholders' agreement. Such a mechanism may shorten litigation when trust breaks down.